We have seen through Hegel a problem. A problem which is to be pinpointed by Schelling, wrestled with by Novalis, and eventually to be disposed of bit by bit through the work of post-Hegelians of the future who seek to explore a tacit axiology.
To what end? It is a problem which seems to lead us to a sort of theoretical abyss. What is “pure difference” after all?
This is surely an ill-informed question, because clearly pure difference is not. But it is this difficult question which we are called approach, to concern ourselves with matters of “living finally” as it were beyond existence, beyond the being-there of Dasein, etc. To break down the distinction between the Biological and the Symbolic, moving towards a conception of the One life.
The spectres of Derrida and Heidegger are brought forward through the Introduction of Novalis’ Philosophical Writings.
Margaret Stoljar writes on page two:
It is clear that these remarks are to be understood with a Nietzschean back-drop for reasons which I hope to make evident. What is at stake here is a concept of “form of life” which is undifferentiated in the One.